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INTOLERABLE BUT MORAL? 
THINKING ABOUT HELL 
Paul T. Jensen 
Thomas Talbott's recent argument for Hell's nonexistence is a sophisticated 
version of hard universalism. I suggest some reasons to question his argument 
and to accept the logical and moral possibility that some humans will not be 
saved. 
If Hell does not exist, those who think it does are merely foolish; if it does 
exist, those who think it doesn't may be in great danger. Only if Hell exists 
can one end up there; but if it does not, no one can end up there even if they 
believe they can. A recent national survey indicates that 60% of all Americans, 
66% of all Protestants, and 57% of all Catholics believe in Hell.' Are these people 
foolishly deceived? Thomas Talbott believes they are. I think he is wrong. 
A garden variety argument for universalism may be put in the following 
way. There are two biblical ways of looking at salvation. One claims that 
only Christian believers will be saved; the other claims that all human persons 
will be saved. 2 The latter is more loving and hence must be true because God 
is love. 3 Talbott recently presented a sophisticated version of this argument. 
In sum, he asserted that (using his numbering system): 
and 
(3) God loves every created person 
(5) God will finally reject some persons and subject those persons to ever-
lasting punishment 
are inconsistent. Furthermore, that 
(3') God loves some created persons but not all 
is necessarily false. And the kind of choice described in 
(5') Some persons will, despite God's best efforts to save them, finally reject 
God and separate themselves from God forever 
is incoherent. And, even if it were coherent, it would be the type of evil "a 
loving God would be required to prevent."4 Talbott's argument rests on the 
assertion that God loves every created person and attempts to demonstrate 
the further claim that God's love entails universalism. 
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Before investigating these claims it might be well to point out that Talbott's 
conclusion seems to qualify as 'hard universalism,' the view that no person 
can be finally lost, as opposed to 'soft universalism,' the view that no person 
will be finally lost. 5 Any view claiming that the salvation of all humans 
follows from the necessary attributes of God would qualify as hard univer-
salism. Any view claiming that the damnation of some humans is logically 
and morally possible, but will never be actual, would qualify as soft univer-
salism. Talbott's argument amounts to the claim that God's essential attribute· 
of love renders it impossible that any person will be finally lost. How should 
this argument be assessed? 
That God loves every created person is probably more widely held than 
any assumption about God. But even widely held assumptions require some 
justification. How would one go about justifying this claim? Might it be a 
truth of reason? To my knowledge no ontological argument exists to prove 
that God possesses essentially the attribute of love. Can it be derived from 
experience? The preponderance of evidence seems to stand on the negative 
side. Though many people experience unmistakable and even extraordinary 
instances of God's providence, which they interpret as evidence of God's love 
for them, they also weather considerable grief and pain, and witness more in 
others. This leads me to conclude that insufficient experiential evidence exists 
for justifying the claim that God loves all his creatures. 
Thus, if such a belief is true, only God's special revelation of it could be 
a sufficient justification for believing it.6 And here the difficulty emerges, for 
the biblical theist finds intertwined with the assertions of God's love, God's 
condemnation of unbelievers and the assertion that they will perish. The most 
famous, of course, are the familiar verses found in John 3:16-19. 
If one cannot know the truth of (3) apart from special divine revelation, it 
seems unlikely that one can discover the nature of God's love for his creatures 
apart from that revelation as well. If that is so, pronouncements about the 
composition of divine love demand a number of prior theological commit-
ments, among which are the following: there is a special divine revelation; 
it is the only source for certain central Christian beliefs; and it stands as a 
control over those beliefs. Lest I be accused here of theological pedantry, I 
would urge that calling attention to these affirmations seems imperative in 
light of Talbott's claim that his conclusions regarding Hell represent biblical 
theism. 7 If one wants to remain open to persuasion of Hell's nonexistence, as 
I do, it is well to be reminded of these; for, in the end, one may need to choose 
between faithfulness to a specially revealed truth and acquiescence to forceful 
and appealing arguments against it. 
Along side the biblical affirmations of God's love are other more disturbing 
assertions of which the following are a sample: 
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You are not a God who takes pleasure in evil; with you the wicked cannot 
dwell. The arrogant cannot stand in your presence; you hate all who do 
wrong. (Ps. 5:5) 
The Lord examines the righteous, but the wicked and those who love violence 
his soul hates. (Ps. 11:5-6) [Cpo Provo 6:16-19; In. 3:36; Rom. 1:18; Eph. 
2:1-3] 
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These texts, and many others, serve as a sober reminder that the Hebrew 
mind affirmed that God hates wrongdoers and acts in wrath against human 
wickedness. These texts can be dismissed as revealing nothing true about 
God, or they can be treated as equal in weight to the texts asserting God's 
universal love. The former tack leaves nothing to be discussed, but those who 
follow it must surrender the title "biblical theist." The latter tack requires 
harmonizing the dual affirmations of divine love and wrath; it means asserting 
in some coherent way that humans are simultaneously objects of God's love 
and God's wrath. Can this be done? I believe it can. 
Calvin-bashing has become something of a cottage industry lately, and 
Augustine's unpopularity lags not far behind Calvin's. I haven't the space to 
defend them as faithful interpreters of the Hebrew scriptures or of St. John 
and St. Paul, but both offered a coherent and exegetically sound harmony of 
this paradox. The term "hate" used in the Hebrew scriptures presents the 
greatest difficulty.8 If it means detesting and intending to destroy, it seems 
impossible to hate and love the same object. But there is a way out of this 
dilemma: God may simultaneously hate and love the same individual by 
hating one aspect of that individual and loving another. 
Augustine explained that God simultaneously hates and loves us because 
he knows how to hate us "for what we were that he had not made [viz. 
sin] ... and to love what he had made."9 Calvin stated similarly that "God, 
apart from Christ is always angry with us," although he "does not hate in us 
His own workmanship, that is, the fact that he has created us as living beings, 
but He hates our uncleanness, which has extinguished the light of His im-
age."10 Neither Augustine nor Calvin can be construed as believing God 
actually hates individuals if by that is meant that he hates what he has created. 
God's wrath against sin means he desires and intends to destroy it. It seems 
reasonable to hold that though God loves all created individuals, those who by 
their wicked choices destroy his workmanship and image fall under his wrath. 
The issue then comes to this: can persons so distort and corrupt God's image 
as to be only worthy of his wrath/hatred; or can they so defile and pervert 
the divine creation as to destroy their status as beings loved by God? The 
Hebrew scriptures, the words of Jesus as recorded in the New Testament, and 
the writings of St. John and St. Paul strongly imply that it is. My major point 
here is not to prove that Hell exists, but only to demonstrate that (3) and (5) 
are not inconsistent and that while (3') may be false, (5') is not incoherent. 
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It is one thing to say God loves sinners, quite another to say God loves 
evil. What separates universalists and those who believe in Hell's existence 
is not whether God loves all created individuals, but the analysis of what 
divine love means. If "God loves me" means that God must necessarily save 
me, then of course God cannot be said to love me unless he saves me. But I 
can find no scriptural warrant for this as the meaning of divine love. The New 
Testament presentation of divine love includes two assertions: (i) that God 
gave his one and only Son so that those who believe will not perish (In. 3: 16), 
and (ii) that while we were still sinners Christ died for us (Rom. 5:8). So far 
as I can see, neither of these explanations of the meaning of divine love entails 
uni versalism. 
The question turns on whether human individuals can become evil by their 
own choices and actions and there seems abundant evidence to affirm that 
they can. ll Karl Barth, whose enigmatic stance on universalism is well 
known, asserted at the end of his Church Dogmatics that "To the man who 
persistently tries to change the truth into untruth, God does not owe eternal 
patience and therefore deliverance."12 A view of God's love that construes it 
as the Ananke which robs the divine will of the freedom to deal with humans 
in mercy or justice seems to my mind biblically misinformed and logically 
suspect. 
The New Testament presents human salvation as the product of divine 
grace. Salvation implies deliverance from an unpleasant consequence; grace 
implies ill-dessert. Is it the case that I do not deserve salvation? Unless it is, 
I am not saved by grace. The universalist must assert either (i) that all humans 
deserve salvation, or (ii) that all humans will avail themselves of the means 
of grace (soft universalism), or (iii) that God's love necessitates that all be 
saved despite their ill-dessert (hard universalism). The difficulty with hard 
universalism is that genuine human ill-dessert requires salvation to be the 
product of divine supererogatory goodness. But the very notion of super-
erogatory goodness, i.e., good acts which God can justly leave undone, makes 
the claim that God is required to perform them incoherent. Thus, if humans 
are ill-deserving of divine salvation, God can justly not save them. Talbott 
does not deny this, but his argument implies that divine love vitiates divine 
freedom: God's love necessitates that God perform supererogatorily good 
acts. I find this unintelligible. 
The perfect love of Father, Son, and Spirit within the divine Trinity cannot 
be added to or subtracted from by virtue of God's relations to his creatures, 
nor can God's love be perfected only through creation and redemptionY 
Thus, it cannot be argued that God's love is greater or fuller in the salvation 
of all individuals. But Talbott holds that: 
In the case of an omnipotent and omniscient being ... the claim that such a 
being loves a person for awhile and then ceases to love that person makes 
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no sense at all. Suppose that for fifty years God were to act towards Smith 
in exactly the way he would act towards someone he loves, and suppose that 
God were to do so in the full knowledge that forever afterwards he would 
act towards Smith in unloving ways. Could we then say that God loved Smith 
for awhile?-that for awhile he intended to promote the best interest of 
Smith? Surely not. In the case of God, it surely is a necessary truth that God 
loves a person at one time (in the New Testament sense of agape love) only 
if he loves that person at all subsequent times. 14 
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But this does not seem to be a necessary truth at all. I believe it miscon-
strues the nature of divine love by failing to take account of divine wrath and 
human responsibility. Humans are mutable; God's love and wrath are con-
stant. Which one I place myself under depends on the free choices I make. 
As a sinful individual I am simultaneously under both divine love and wrath. 
The issue is whether I can destroy what God loves. Can I willfully render 
myself solely an object of divine wrath? Talbott believes I cannot. The fright-
ful truth about myself, however, is that when I contemplate my own being I 
find numerous reasons to think I can. Perhaps I should not have been given 
such power, but then, perhaps there are mysteries too deep for human reason 
to penetrate. If I willfully destroy what God loves, I cannot hold that God 
continues to love me unless I am prepared to subscribe to the blasphemous 
notion that God loves evil and wickedness. I, at least, am unwilling to endorse 
such a judgment. 
Peter Geach opined that "People say rather lightly that they could not bear 
for a damned soul to be punished unendingly; but someone confronted with 
the damned would find it impossible to wish that things so evil should be 
happy-particularly when the misery is seen as the direct and natural conse-
quence of the gUilt."15 Talbott objects to this on the grounds that if he loves 
his daughter as he loves himself, her damnation would be an intolerable loss 
to him and would undermine the possibility of his own happiness. Further-
more, he argues that, from the premise that he could not wish to see his 
daughter both morally corrupt and happy, it does not follow that he would 
not wish to see her happy, for if his daughter should become as corrupt and 
miserable as Geach describes, that would increase his sense of loss and his 
desire to see her both redeemed and happy.16 
It would be foolish and uncharitable to suggest that Talbott's feelings re-
specting his daughter are mistaken. Indeed, as a parent I am strongly inclined 
to agree with him. But my belief that humans can make themselves evil causes 
me to hesitate. So as not to offend Talbott unnecessarily, let me use my own 
son as the example. Let us suppose that, as I earnestly pray will never happen, 
my son were to destroy the image of God in himself and willfully place 
himself under the divine wrath by becoming wicked. Precisely who is it that 
I would desire to see both redeemed and happy? The son who once was, or 
the son who now is? Do not many parents tragically, but rightly, say to a 
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child, I love what you used to be, but hate what you have made of yourself? 
To hate wickedness and intensely desire that it be destroyed is not unloving 
and in no way vitiates the reality of one's love for a person who once was, 
but is no more. 
This carries implications for the love of enemies as well. According to 
Talbott, "if supremely worthwhile happiness requires that I learn to love my 
enemies even as I love my own daughter, then the damnation of [a] single 
person is incompatible with such happiness in me."17 But surely the command 
to love our enemies is not a command to love their wickedness. We are 
commanded to love them because we are utterly ignorant of the state of their 
souls. Performing vicious and wicked acts does not mean ipso facto that they 
have destroyed God's image in themselves. (Has any recipient of God's gra-
cious redemption not performed such acts?) God requires Christians to act in 
kind and generous ways toward their enemies precisely because we are igno-
rant of our enemies' motives, desires, and intentions. God does not lack such 
knowledge; he who knows every aspect of every mind acts towards individu-
als in love or wrath depending on the motives, desires, intentions, and choices 
of the individuals in question. When or if I become privy to this same knowl-
edge I will presumably think as God does. I see no reason to suppose one 
cannot be supremely happy while hating wickedness. On the contrary, it 
seems incredible to me that anyone could be supremely happy who did not 
hate wickedness and earnestly desire its destruction. Thus, the possibility of 
the damnation of sinners is not removed by arguing that God's love requires 
him to prevent each person from "undermining the possibility of supremely 
worthwhile happiness in others."18 If I am damned it is because I have made 
myself wicked and thereby destroyed God's image in me. Unless supremely 
worthwhile happiness entails loving wickedness, no one's damnation can 
destroy supreme happiness in others. 
I suspect many, like me, find the possibility of Hell intolerable but moral-
intolerable, not because some people suffer the consequences of their sinful 
actions, but because it is intolerable for humans to act as wickedly as they 
do. Perhaps Talbott is right; perhaps an omnipotent and perfectly loving God 
would never permit sinners to place themselves under his wrath. If so, those 
who believe Hell exists are merely foolish. If not, it is exceedingly dangerous 
for me to believe that Hell does not exist. Since I have yet to find a reason 
to think God's love forces him to perform supererogatorily good acts, I am 
inclined to agree with Eleonore Stump who suggests that Hell may serve to 
protect the righteous from the wicked. 19 Pray God it does not serve to protect 
the righteous from me. 
Augustana College 
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